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Here we provide more detail on precisely how welfare measures from each of the preference 
elicitation methods can be calculated.   
 
Method 1: Discrete choice  
Consider studies in which consumers are asked to indicate which product (or none) they would 
purchase given price and quality levels.  Data from such studies are typically analyzed using 
random utility theory in which the indirect utility function for individual i is given by: 
iR R iR P V β α + = + εiR if the regular product is purchased,  iN N iN P V β α + = + εiN  if the new product 
is purchased, and  + εiNone if neither the new or regular is purchased, where P is the 
price, and where αk and β are coefficients typically obtained from estimating a conditional logit 
econometric model or some variant on this model.  Marginal WTP for the new quality is 
typically calculated and reported as -(αN - αR)/β.  Although this statistic is useful in many 
situations, it does not necessarily indicate the welfare effects of food policies.       
0 = iNone V
  First, consider the welfare effects of a ban on uninformed consumers.  Assuming a 
conditional logit model was used to analyze the data, aggregate demand for the regular good 



















,          ( A 1 )  where the L subscribe indicates the logit demand, and where N indicates the number of choices 
made by all consumers in a given period.  The uninformed consumer is unaware, however, that 
the new good is now being sold, but they do realize the price has fallen from P1 to P0.  This 


















.          ( A 2 )  
  For uninformed consumers, a ban on the new product serves to increase the price from P0 
to P1 (i.e., demand changes from equation (A2) to equation (A1) and the consumer simply moves 
along the demand curve), and the change in consumer surplus corresponds to the area to the left 
of the demand curve between the price change:  
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where  denotes the consumer surplus change, the subscript L denotes the logit model, the 
subscript BP denotes the ban policy, and the superscript UI denotes the uninformed consumer.   
UI
BP L CS . Δ
  Leggett (2002) refers to the welfare change in (A3) as the “anticipated benefit” as it 
relates to the welfare change based on people’s perceived (or, in this case, incorrect) beliefs 
about product quality.  To more fully characterize the welfare change of the ban, one must also 
factor in the implicit welfare loss people experience from being uninformed – the cost of 
ignorance (Foster and Just, 1989).  The derivations in Leggett (2002) indicate that the cost of 
ignorance is given by: 
























. ] .        ( A 4 )  
Thus, the total welfare change of a ban for uninformed consumers is given by (A3) minus (A4).     Now, consider the welfare effects of a ban on informed consumers.  Informed consumers 
realize that a ban would change the quality of the good, and as such, the demand curve shifts.  In 


















.          ( A 5 )  
After the ban, the utility parameter changes from αN  to αR (i.e., the demand curve shifts), and 
price changes from P0 to P1 because the regular good is more costly to produce.  This means that 



















.          ( A 6 )  
Thus, for informed consumers a ban results in the following consumer surplus change (see Small 
and Rosen, 1978 for details on the welfare calculation):  
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β ] ,     (A7) 
where the superscript I denotes the informed consumer.   
  Rather than banning a new product, regulators may be interested in preserving consumer 
sovereignty by requiring labels.  When products are labeled, all consumers are informed of 
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If consumers are uninformed, the “anticipated” or perceived change in consumer surplus of a 
mandatory labeling policy is   [ ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln(
0 0 1
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+ + + P P P UI
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β ] .     (A9) 
One can also subtract the cost of ignorance given by equation (A4) from the measure in (A9) to 
arrive at the total welfare change accruing to uninformed consumers from a labeling policy.  If 
consumers are fully informed, the change in consumer surplus resulting from the policy is: 
[] ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln(
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,                 (A10) 
where the subscript LP denotes the labeling policy. 
 
Method 2: Individual WTP 
The second approach focuses on methods where one obtains individual estimates on WTP.  
Let   and  indicate individual i’s willingness-to-pay for the regular and new qualities, 
respectively. These willingness-to-pay measures can be used to make welfare calculations. 
Consumer i derives utility, , if a unit of the traditional version of the good is 
consumed, WTP  if a unit of the new good is consumed, and zero otherwise (i.e., the utility 
of non-purchase is normalized to zero).  
iR WTP iN WTP
N iN P −
R iR P WTP −
If only the regular product is offered after the new-product ban, then an individual can 
one choose between two outcomes: regular at P1 and none. The consumer chooses the option 
generating the highest utility, namely  
} 0 , max{ 1 . P WTP CS iR i A − = ,         ( A 1 1 )  
where the subscript A denotes auction or individual-WTP method.  Thus, the consumer surplus 
change from a new product ban if all consumers are fully informed is 
}] 0 , max{ } 0 , [max{ ) / ( 0
1





BP A − − − = Δ ∑
=
,   (A12) where L is the number of participants in the experiment, and as in the previous section, N is the 
total number of choices made over the time period of interest.  
If all consumers are uninformed, the “anticipated benefit” is: 
}] 0 , max{ } 0 , [max{ ) / ( 0
1





BP A − − − = Δ ∑
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,   (A13) 
and the cost of ignorance is: 







BP A WTP WTP I L N COI − = ∑
=
,       ( A 1 4 )  
where IiR is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if individual i is predicted to have chosen 
the regular product at P0.  The total surplus change for uninformed consumers is given by (A13) 
minus (A14).  
Under a mandatory label, an individual can choose between all three products: regular, 
new, and none. She/he will choose the one which generates the highest utility, and thus,  
   .                (A15)  } 0 , , max{ 0 1 . P WTP P WTP CS iN iR i A − − =
The consumer surplus change from a label if all consumers are fully informed is 
}] 0 , max{ } 0 , , [max{ ) / ( 0
1





LP A − − − − = Δ ∑
=
.   (A16) 
If all consumers are uninformed, the “anticipated benefit” is 
}] 0 , max{ } 0 , , [max{ ) / ( 0
1





LP A − − − − = Δ ∑
=
.    (A17) 
  
Method 3: Average WTP with time-series demand Policy makers often need to calculate the welfare effects of various policies, but either do not 
have access to the individual-level WTP data or the logit demand estimates, and only have access 
to information on average WTP for a change in quality.   
Under the method 3, the demand of a representative consumer consists of the numeraire v 
and the quadratic preference for the market good of interest: 
22 (,, , ) ( ) / 2 / 2 RN R N R N R N UQ Q vI a Q a I eQ bQ Q QQ v γ ⎡⎤ =+ − − + − + ⎣⎦ ,              (A18)  
The terms  capture the immediate satisfaction of the representative consumer from 
consuming quantities of the regular good, QR, and the new good, QN. The parameter 
, ab> 0
γ  measures 
the degree of substitutability between the two goods. 
 The  parameter  e represents an additional disutility (or the utility with e<0) linked to the 
new product. The effects of this disutility is captured by the term  N IeQ − . The parameter I 
represents the knowledge of the specific characteristic. If the consumer is not informed of the 
specific characteristic then I = 0. Conversely, I = 1 implies that the consumer is informed of the 
specific characteristic and can internalize the quality change and adjust consumption 
accordingly. The maximization of the utility function under a budget constraint yields a demand 
function for each consumer.   
Under a new-product ban,   is equal to zero and the inverse demand for the regular 
product is given by   
N Q
   1() RR p Qa b Q =− .          ( A 1 9 )  
The parameters a and b can be determined by classical calibration methods using existing data 
on price elasticity of the demand and equilibrium prices and quantities of the regular product.  
Using existing data on the quantity   of the regular product sold over a period, the average  ˆ
R Qprice P1 observed over the period, and the direct price elasticity  ε   11 (/ ) ( / RR dQ dP P Q ) = ) 
obtained from time-series econometric estimates, the calibration leads to estimated values for the 
demand equal to  
1 ˆ 1/ / R bQ ε =−  P  and 
1 ˆ
R ab Q P = + 
N Q
. From (A18), the overall surplus for an 
economy is UQ , where the income R in the budget constraint is not considered 
in the estimations. 
1 (, 0 , , 0 R R P Q − ) R
When the new product is allowed, then  . As in the previous sub-sections, with the 
absence of labels we assume only new products are sold at price P0<P1. The overall demand of 
informed consumers with I=1 for the new product is   
0 >
  0() N N p Qa e b Q =−−
R R WTP WTP / )
,         ( A 2 0 )  
 Empirically, the parameter e is determined by average WTP data coming from a 
survey/experiment where information is revealed. The relative variation in WTP based on the 
survey/experiment provides a measure of the inverse demand shift, 
.  By using notations of introduced with method 1 (discrete choice), 
N WTP ( = δ
N WTP
−
/ N α β =−  and  / R








δ = .          ( A 2 1 )  
This value is independent of the price coefficient,β , which means that (A21) isolates the utility 
change for the new product.  Now, note that the inverse demand curves can be viewed 
conceptually as maximum WTP curves, where the price can be replaced with WTP.  Thus, using 
the inverse demands in equations (A19) and (A20), the relative price variation is equal to the 
inverse demand shift defined by  01 ) ( NR pQ pQ 1 [( /() R pQ ) ] δ − =
1() R Q
, which, after manipulating 
equations (19) and (20) leads to the equality ep δ = − .    The demand for new products with uninformed consumers is defined by   when 
price is P0 and a cost of ignorance equal to   because of the lack of awareness not 
internalized in the demand. The consumer surplus is  .  With 
uninformed consumers, the consumer-surplus variation linked to a new-product ban is  
N ab Q −
] N Q −
N eQ
0 [( 0 , , , 0 ) NN UQ R P Q e −
  .1 0 ( ,0, ,0) (0, , ,0)
UI
TB P R R N N N CS U Q R PQ U Q R PQ eQ ⎡ ⎤ Δ= − − − − ⎣ ⎦ ,    (A22) 
where the subscript T denotes the time-series model, the subscript BP denotes the ban policy, and 
the superscript UI denotes the uninformed consumer. 
  The demand for new products with informed consumers is defined by (A20). The 
consumer surplus is  .  With informed consumers and a subscript I for 
informed, the consumer-surplus variation linked to a new-product ban is  
0 (0, , ,1) NN UQ R P Q −
  .     (A23)   We 
now turn to the scenario with mandatory label allowing the coexistence of cloned and regular 
beef. Beyond the representative consumer, total demand can be partitioned into two groups of 
consumers for the disutility. A proportion (1
.1 ( ,0, ,0) (0, , ,1)
I
TB P R R N N CS U Q R PQ U Q R PQ Δ= − − −
)
0
β − of consumers avoid cloned beef in lieu of the 
regular product with a disutility  . A proportion  2 e β  of consumers choose the cloned beef 
because of the benefit of lower price with a disutility   where  1 e 1 ee 2 <  and  12 (1 ) ee e β β =+ −  in 
(A20). The scenario with a new product signaled by a label (with I=1) leads to an inverse 
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.        ( A 2 4 )  
, RN QQ are the quantities bought under a mandatory label.  The parameters  1, e γ  are determined by using the equations (A22) and the given price 
P0,P1  linked to the supply. As a and b were previously determined in the initial calibration, and 
, RN QQ can be determined from the experiment/survey, the parameter γ  is determined by 
solving,  1 N Pa b Q =− R Q γ − . From the estimation of γ , the second equation 
01 N R Pa eb Q Q γ =−− −  can be solved for finding  . From the experiment/surveys, it is possible 
to determine 
1 e
, RN QQ since we know the percentage M  of consumers choosing regular products 
under the ban, namely  ,1 () / LR M DP N =  by using equation (A6) with method 1 (data from 
method 2 could alternatively be used). After the introduction of the new product and from the 
experiment/survey, we are able to determine the percentage  2, 0 () / LN M DP N =  of consumers 
choosing the new product, the percentage  1, LR 1 / () M DP N =  of consumers choosing regular 
product by using (A8). With the observed quantity   of the regular product sold on the market 
before the introduction of the new product, the estimated equilibrium quantities 
ˆ
R Q
, RN QQ used for 
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        ( A 2 5 )
 
With the estimation of  , RN QQ, the parameters  1, e γ  can be calculated as described above. Note 
that this methodology under different contexts of information was not completely introduced 
before.  
Under a mandatory label, consumers can choose between products and the surplus is 
01 (0, , ,1) (1 ) ( ,0, ,1) NN R UQ R P Q U Q R P Q ββ ×− + − ×− R  .     The consumer surplus change from a mandatory label (with the subscript LP) if all consumers 
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1 .   (A26) 
If all consumers are uninformed without a label (I=0), the consumer surplus is 
.0
0
(0, , ,1) (1 ) ( ,0, ,1)
(, 0 , , 0 )
UI
TL P N N R R
NN N
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UQ R P Q e Q
ββ Δ= × − + − × −
⎡⎤ −− − ⎣⎦
1
.      (A27) 
 